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Intra-industry trade: A Krugman-Ricardo model and data 
 







This paper develops a many-good, many-country model of international trade 
which combines Ricardian comparative advantage and increasing returns to scale. 
It is shown how the gains from trade depend on relative country sizes, trade cost, 
and the technological similarity between countries. Trade consists of both inter- 
and intra-industry trade. The trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry 
trade is positively related to own country size and the number of exported sectors, 
and is negatively related to average partner country size, the number of imported 
sectors, and the trade cost. The empirical evidence supports most of these 
predictions, and the model fits the data better for OECD than for non-OECD 
countries.  
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1  Introduction 
 
As the international trading system becomes more complex, new theories have been 
developed to explain trade patterns between countries. Traditional trade theories focus on 
comparative advantage, in terms of technological differences in the Ricardian model, or 
factor endowment differences in the Heckscher-Ohlin and specific factors models. More 
recently, new trade theories have emphasised imperfect competition and increasing returns to 
scale, such as the Krugman (1980) model, and heterogeneity across firms as in Melitz (2003).  
 
There is an important literature which combines aspects of various international trade 
theories, providing a more unified picture of the reasons for international trade. For instance, 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) combine Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowments with Spence-
Dixit-Stiglitz imperfect competition to show the pattern of trade that emerges when both 
traditional and new trade theories are combined. Davis (1995) combines Heckscher-Ohlin 
factor endowments with Ricardian comparative advantage to show how intra-industry trade 
can arise in the absence of imperfect competition. More recently, Bernard et al (2007) 
combine a Melitz (2003) model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms with 
Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowments to show how firm heterogeneity interacts with country 
characteristics in international trade. The present paper contributes to this literature, by 
combining Ricardian comparative advantage with imperfect competition.  
 
To be precise, this paper develops a multi-sector, multi-country model of international trade, 
based on both traditional and new trade theories. It combines Ricardian technological 
differences across countries and monopolistic competition of the Krugman (1980) variety. 
The trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd (TWGL) index of intra-industry trade is derived as a 
function of the model’s parameters. We show that the model yields determinants of the 
TWGL index which are new to the literature. These are the number of industries exported and 
imported by a country; the former is positively related to the TWGL index, while the latter is 
negatively related to it. The model’s predictions find supportive empirical evidence from a 
sample of 118 countries in 2010, using data from the UN Comtrade database.  
 
On the theoretical side, this paper is related to models that extend the monopolistic 
competition model of trade in several ways. For instance, Ricci (1997) combines Ricardian 
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comparative advantage and monopolistic competition in a two country, two sector model. 
Chung (2007) allows for differences across countries in the fixed and marginal costs of 
production in a model of international trade under monopolistic competition. Shelburne 
(2002) develops a multi-country version of the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model. The 
present paper innovates relative to this literature by adopting a many-country, many-sector 
framework, which more readily lends itself to empirical analysis.  
 
There is of course a literature that includes models that have many goods and countries. For 
instance, Eaton and Kortum (2002) extend the Dornbusch et al (1977) Ricardian model with a 
continuum of goods to many countries. Kikuchi et al (2008) develop a many-sector, two-
country model of international trade with Ricardian comparative advantage and monopolistic 
competition. By introducing many countries and trade costs, the present paper generates 
additional results on the pattern of trade relative to Kikuchi et al (2008). Romalis (2004) 
combines the many-good Heckscher-Ohlin model developed by Dornbusch et al (1980) with 
trade costs and Krugman (1980) monopolistic competition. Chaney (2008) and Arkolakis et 
al (2008) extend the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms model to many countries. In these 
models, firms within each sector have different productivities, but all countries have the same 
technology. In contrast, our model has identical firms in each sector, but countries have 
comparative advantage in different sectors. Finally, Hsieh and Ossa (2011) develop a many-
country, many-industry model of trade which combines Ricardian comparative advantage, 
Krugman (1980) imperfect competition, and Melitz (2003) firm heterogeneity. They use the 
model to analyse the effects on world incomes of productivity growth in China, whereas our 
focus in this paper is on intra-industry trade.   
 
On the empirical side, there is a vast literature documenting and analysing the determinants 
of intra-industry trade. This literature has been surveyed by Greenaway and Milner (1987, 
2005) and Greenaway and Torstensson (1997). Grubel and Lloyd (1975) was the first major 
study of the phenomenon. Much of the earlier empirical work was exploratory in nature, for 
instance Balassa and Bauwens (1987). More recent work has mainly been based on the 
theoretical approach of Helpman and Krugman (1985). Helpman (1987) was the first of 
these, and was followed by Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), Kim and Oh (2001), Debeare 
(2005), Cieslik (2005), and Kamata (2010). These papers are based on the model without 
trade costs. Bergstrand (1990) and Bergstrand and Egger (2006) formally introduce trade 
costs into the model and develop theoretically-founded empirical predictions on the 
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relationship between intra-industry trade and trade costs. Compared to the recent literature, 
the present paper develops a new model of intra-industry trade which generates new 
empirical predictions as discussed above, for which we find strong evidence in the data.   
 
Section 2 sets out the model, while Section 3 discusses the no-trade equilibrium, and Section 
4 discusses the open economy equilibrium. We derive two main theoretical results. First, we 
show in Section 4 that the gain from trade arises from both traditional and new sources: from 
specialisation in the sectors in which a country has a comparative advantage in, and 
increasing numbers of goods available for consumption2. The second main theoretical result, 
which we show in Section 5, is that international trade consists of both inter-industry and 
intra-industry trade. Intra-industry trade arises because more than one country has a 
comparative advantage in each sector; if only one country has a comparative advantage in 
each sector, then all trade would be inter-industry. We show how the various parameters of 
the model affect the trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd (TWGL) index of intra-industry trade. In 
particular, own country size and the number of exported sectors are positively related to the 
TWGL index, while average partner country size, the number of imported sectors and 
transport costs are negatively related to the TWGL index.  
 
Section 6 documents the data used in the empirical analysis. In Section 7 we show that the 
empirical evidence is mostly consistent with what the theoretical model predicts about the 
determinants of the TWGL index. The TWGL index is found to be positively related to the 
number of exported sectors and negatively related to the number of imported sectors. Trade 
costs as measured by distance between trading partners and average tariffs are negatively 
related to the TWGL index. The variables based on the model explain a larger fraction of the 
variation in the TWGL index for OECD countries than for non-OECD countries. Section 8 
provides some brief conclusions.  
 
2 The model 
 
There are T countries, 𝑖 =  1, . . . ,𝑇 and S sectors, 𝑠 =  1, . . . , 𝑆. Labour is the only factor of 
production, and is perfectly mobile across sectors but perfectly immobile across countries. 
                                                          
2 In this paper, as will be made clear below, the economy consists of many sectors, and each sector consists of 
many goods.  
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Each country has 𝐿𝑖 units of labour. Define 𝐿𝑊 =  ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑖  as the world supply of labour, so that 
𝐿𝑊���� = 𝐿𝑊 𝑇⁄  is the average country size.  
 
The representative consumer’s utility is a Cobb-Douglas function:  
𝑈 =  ∏ 𝐶𝑠1𝑆𝑆𝑠=1       (1)  
Each sector consists of many goods, so that consumption in each sector 𝐶𝑠  is a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) sub-utility function defined over 𝑔 =  1, . . . ,𝐺 goods:  
𝐶𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑐𝑔𝑠𝜌𝐺𝑔=1       (2) 
Where 0 < 𝜌 < 1, and 𝑐𝑔𝑠 is the consumption of good 𝑔 in sector 𝑠. Each good 𝑔 is produced 
under increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition as in Krugman (1980). All 
firms in the same sector in a country share the same cost function – there is no firm 
heterogeneity of the Melitz (2003) type. Divide sectors into those that a country has a 
comparative advantage in, 𝑆1, and those that a country has a comparative disadvantage in, 𝑆2. 
The labour used in country 𝑖 in producing a good 𝑔 in sector 𝑠 is given by:   
𝑙𝑔𝑠 =  𝛾�𝑎 + 𝑏𝑞𝑔𝑠�                  for                     𝑠 ∈ 𝑆1     (3) 
𝑙𝑔𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑞𝑔𝑠                          for                     𝑠 ∈ 𝑆2     (4) 
where 𝑞𝑔𝑠 is the output of good 𝑔 in sector 𝑠, and 𝛾 < 1 reflects the comparative advantage 
of country 𝑖  in sectors 𝑆1 , in the form of lower cost of production. 𝛾  is assumed to be 
common across countries but may apply to different sectors in different countries. 
Technological advantage is synonymous with comparative advantage in this paper; we favour 
the latter term in the remainder of the paper. Let the number of comparative advantage 
sectors be proportional to the labour force in each country: 𝑆1𝑖 = 𝜆𝐿𝑖, where 𝜆 is constant 
across countries.3 Each sector has the same number of countries which have a comparative 
advantage in it. Hence there will be 𝜆𝐿𝑊/𝑆 countries with a comparative advantage in each 
sector. Assume that 𝜆𝐿𝑊 > 𝑆 ; that is, the number of sectors which countries have a 
comparative advantage in, exceeds the total number of sectors. This ensures that there is at 
least one country which has a comparative advantage in each sector.  
 
The assumption on the number of comparative advantage sectors plays a key role in 
simplifying the analysis below. By fixing the number of comparative advantage sectors, it 
prevents agglomeration forces (see Krugman (1980), Fujita et al (1999)), so that, whilst 
                                                          
3  For simplicity we ignore the integer constraints on the number of sectors a country has a comparative 
advantage in, and on the number of countries with a comparative advantage in each sector.  
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because of iceberg trade costs prices and hence real wages do differ across countries, they do 
not lead to concentration of labour beyond that predicted by comparative advantage. This 
therefore has implications for the welfare analysis and for obtaining a relatively simple 
expression for the TWGL index later on.  
 
Assume full employment, and free entry and exit of firms so that profits are zero in 
equilibrium. Since in equilibrium all firms in sector 𝑠 will charge the same price and produce 
the same output, the total labour used in each sector is simply the number of goods in each 
sector times the labour used in each good: 𝐿𝑠 =  𝑛𝑠𝑙𝑔𝑠. Then following the same steps as in 
Krugman (1980), the solution to the model gives: 
𝑝1 = 𝛾𝑤𝑏𝜌               𝑞𝑔1 =  �𝑎𝑏� � 𝜌1−𝜌�                 𝑛1 = (1−𝜌)𝐿𝑠𝛾𝑎            for           𝑠 ∈ 𝑆1 (5)  
𝑝2 = 𝑤𝑏𝜌                 𝑞𝑔2 =  �𝑎𝑏� � 𝜌1−𝜌�                 𝑛2 = (1−𝜌)𝐿𝑠𝑎             for           𝑠 ∈ 𝑆2 (6) 
Where 𝑤 is the wage rate, 𝑝1 is the price of each good 𝑔 in each sector in 𝑆1, and 𝑛1 is the 
endogenously-determined number of goods in each sector in 𝑆1. Hence there are lower prices 
and a larger number of goods in the sectors with a comparative advantage as compared to the 
other sectors (assuming the labour used in each sector is the same), although output of each 
good is the same across sectors.  
 
3 Autarkic equilibrium 
 
In autarky, each country must produce all sectors, and given the Cobb-Douglas utility and 
free movement of labour across sectors, will devote 𝐿𝑠 = 𝐿𝑖 𝑆⁄  labour to each sector4. Then:  
𝑛1  =  (1−𝜌)𝐿𝑖𝑆𝛾𝑎                     and                     𝑛2  =  (1−𝜌)𝐿𝑖𝑆𝑎     (7)  
Total consumption equals output and is identical across goods so individual consumption is 
𝑐𝑔𝑠
𝐴 =  𝑞𝑔𝑠 𝐿𝑖⁄ . Because all goods in each sector are symmetric, we have:  
𝐶𝑠
𝐴  = ∑ �𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐴 �𝜌𝐺𝑔=1 = 𝑛𝑠�𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐴 �𝜌         = 𝑛1�𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐴 �𝜌 = (1−𝜌)𝐿𝑖𝑆𝛾𝑎 �𝑎𝑏 𝜌1−𝜌 1𝐿𝑖 �𝜌           for          𝑠 ∈ 𝑆1    (8a) = 𝑛2�𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐴 �𝜌 = (1−𝜌)𝐿𝑖𝑆𝑎 �𝑎𝑏 𝜌1−𝜌 1𝐿𝑖�𝜌           for          𝑠 ∈ 𝑆2    (8b) 
                                                          
4 From equations (5) and (6), output of each good in each sector is the same, but labour used in each good in 
each comparative advantage sector is 𝛾 < 1 times the labour used in each non-comparative advantage sector. 
However, each comparative advantage sector has 1 𝛾⁄  times the number of goods as in each non-comparative 
advantage sector, so the total labour used in each sector is the same.  
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Hence, utility under autarky is:  
𝑈𝑖
𝐴 = �𝑛1�𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐴 �𝜌�𝜆𝐿𝑖𝑆 �𝑛2�𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐴 �𝜌�𝑆−𝜆𝐿𝑖𝑆 =  �(1−𝜌)𝐿𝑖𝑆𝑎 �𝑎𝑏 𝜌1−𝜌 1𝐿𝑖�𝜌� �1𝛾�𝜆𝐿𝑖𝑆     (9) 
Equation (9) shows that utility under autarky is increasing in the size of the country 𝐿𝑖, the 
number of comparative advantage sectors 𝜆, and the degree of comparative advantage in the 
𝑆1 sectors (the smaller is 𝛾). On the other hand utility is decreasing in the cost parameters 𝑎 
and 𝑏 , and in the number of sectors 𝑆 . Finally, utility under autarky has a U-shaped 
relationship with the elasticity of substitution 𝜌 . Note also that if 𝛾 = 1 (no comparative 
advantage differences across sectors) and 𝑆 = 1 (only one sector), equation (9) reduces to 
utility under autarky in the Krugman (1980) model.  
  
4 Open economy equilibrium 
 
When international trade is allowed, each country will specialise in and export the 𝑆1 = 𝜆𝐿𝑖 
sectors in which it has a comparative advantage, and will import the other 𝑆2 = 𝑆 − 𝜆𝐿𝑖 
sectors from the other countries 5 . This implies that larger countries produce a more 
diversified range of sectors than small countries, which is in accord with the empirical 
findings of Hummels and Klenow (2005). In addition, because there are many goods in each 
sector, and there are 𝜆𝐿𝑊 𝑆⁄ > 1  countries which have a comparative advantage in each 
sector, a country will also import goods from the sectors in which it has a comparative 
advantage. That is, trade will be both inter- and intra-industry in nature.  
 
In the jargon of the new trade literature, when trade is liberalised, new firms enter the sectors 
where a country has comparative advantage and produce a larger number of goods in these 
sectors, while firms in the other sectors exit. Therefore, all the labour in each country is used 
in the 𝑆1 = 𝜆𝐿𝑖 sectors in which it has a comparative advantage. It is well-known that there is 
indeterminacy in production in the Ricardian model (see for example Eaton and Kortum 
(2012)). To simplify the analysis, we make the fairly strong assumption that labour is equally 
divided between the country’s comparative advantage sectors when international trade is 
allowed. That is, 𝐿𝑠 = 𝐿𝑖 𝜆𝐿𝑖⁄ = 1 𝜆⁄ . As we will see later on, this assumption enables us to 
make a clear prediction about the relationship between the parameters of the model and the 
                                                          
5 Will countries always specialise in free trade? Yes, provided there are gains from trade. Specialisation in a 
country’s comparative advantage sectors results in the largest number of goods in the world economy, thus 
maximises welfare of all countries.  
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pattern of trade between countries, so it is an empirical issue whether this is an appropriate 
assumption to make.  
 
Suppose that international trade occurs in the presence of iceberg trade costs6 such that for 
every unit of a good exported, 𝜏 <  1  units arrive at the destination country; 1 − 𝜏  is 
therefore the trade cost. For simplicity let 𝜏 be identical across countries and sectors. Assume 
that the trade cost is always small enough so that all countries always find it beneficial to 
engage in international trade. That is, every country will export its comparative advantage 
goods to every other country in the world. It can be shown that the number of goods produced 
in each sector does not depend on the trade cost. Then, for a producer in a comparative 
advantage sector of a country, letting an asterisk denote values for consumers in other 
countries, the equilibrium prices and quantities are (analogously to equations (5) and (6) 
above):  










                                      𝑛𝑠𝑊𝐹𝑇 = 𝑛𝑠𝐹𝑇 �𝜆𝐿𝑊𝑆 � = (1−𝜌)𝐿𝑊𝛾𝑎𝑆     (12) 
Where 𝑛𝑠𝑊𝐹𝑇  is the number of goods produced in the world in that sector. Note that, comparing 
equations (10) and (11), consumers consume a larger quantity of domestically-produced 
goods than foreign-produced goods. Hence there is a home bias in consumption, driven by 
the trade cost.  
 
For sectors 𝑆2  where a country does not have a comparative advantage in, all goods are 
imported so total consumption is:  
𝐶𝑠∈𝑆2 = 𝑛𝑠𝑊𝐹𝑇 ��𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐹𝑇�∗�𝜌 = 𝑛𝑠𝑊𝐹𝑇 �𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐹𝑇�𝜌𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌     (13) 
For sectors 𝑆1 where a country has a comparative advantage in, this is equal to consumption 
of goods produced domestically plus consumption of goods produced in the rest of the world:  
𝐶𝑠∈𝑆1 = 𝑛𝑠𝐹𝑇�𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐹𝑇�𝜌 + (𝑛𝑠𝑊𝐹𝑇 − 𝑛𝑠𝐹𝑇)�𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐹𝑇�𝜌𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌    (14a) = �𝑛𝑠𝐹𝑇 + (𝑛𝑠𝑊𝐹𝑇 − 𝑛𝑠𝐹𝑇)𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌� �𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐹𝑇�𝜌     (14b) 
Hence utility when international trade is allowed is:  
                                                          
6  Despite dramatic reductions in formal trade barriers such as tariffs in recent decades, the total cost of 




𝐹𝑇 =  �𝑐𝑔𝑠𝐹𝑇�𝜌 �𝑛𝑠𝐹𝑇 + (𝑛𝑠𝑊𝐹𝑇 − 𝑛𝑠𝐹𝑇)𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌�𝜆𝐿𝑖𝑆 �𝑛𝑠𝑊𝐹𝑇 𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌�𝑆−𝜆𝐿𝑖𝑆    (15) 
Define the gains from trade as the ratio between the trade and the autarkic utility. The gains 
from trade are:  
Gaini = 𝑈𝑖𝐹𝑇𝑈𝑖𝐴 = � 𝐿𝑖𝐿𝑊�𝜌−1 �𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌𝛾 �𝑆−𝜆𝐿𝑖𝑆 �𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌 + �1 − 𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌� 𝑆𝜆𝐿𝑊 �𝜆𝐿𝑖𝑆    (16) 
Gains from trade arise if 𝑈𝑖𝐹𝑇 𝑈𝑖𝐴⁄ > 1. This clearly depends on the trade cost 𝜏, so equation 
(16) also implicitly defines the minimum value of 𝜏 (the maximum value of the trade cost) for 
which countries will trade and gain from trade.  
 
It can be shown that: 
𝑑Gaini
𝑑(𝐿𝑖 𝐿𝑊⁄ ) < 0,                      𝑑Gaini𝑑𝑆 > 0,                       𝑑Gaini𝑑𝜆 < 0,   (17a)  𝑑Gaini
𝑑𝛾
< 0,                         𝑑Gaini
𝑑𝜏
> 0,                        𝑑Gaini
𝑑𝜌
< 0   (17b) 
That is, the gains from trade increase as the relative size of the country 𝐿𝑖/𝐿𝑊 decreases, the 
number of sectors 𝑆  increases, the number of sectors each country has a comparative 
advantage in 𝜆  decreases, 𝛾  decreases (that is, the degree of comparative advantage 
increases), 𝜏 increases (the trade cost falls), and the love-for-variety parameter 𝜌 decreases 
(the lower the elasticity of substitution between goods). These results are similar to those 
obtained in other models. In particular, smaller countries gain more than larger countries and 
trade costs reduce the gain from trade, while the greater the difference between countries (the 
smaller is 𝜆 or 𝛾), the greater the gain (see Ethier (2009)).  
 
5 Trade patterns 
 
With international trade, each country is specialised in the 𝑆1 = 𝜆𝐿𝑖 sectors in which it has a 
technological advantage. Assume that trade is balanced, and that a country devotes 1/𝜆 
labour to each of its comparative advantage sectors. Trade costs influence the value of trade 
in three related ways. First, it raises the price of imports relative to domestically-produced 
goods. This is the approach used in the data, where exports are measured net of freight and 
insurance (free on board, f.o.b.), while imports are measured including freight and insurance 
(cost, insurance and freight, c.i.f.). Second, because traded goods are more expensive than 
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domestically produced goods, the quantity of goods traded is reduced. These two effects can 
be seen in equations (10) and (11) above. 
 
The third way in which trade costs influence the value of trade is that trade costs use real 
resources – the quantity of a good available for consumption is reduced by the trade cost. The 
real resource used in consuming one unit of a foreign-produced good domestically is 1 𝜏⁄ > 1 
units of the good. Therefore, the total domestic demand for foreign-produced goods relative 







= 𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌      (18) 
This is also the demand in any one country for goods produced in every other country relative 
to goods produced in that country.  
 
Recall from equations (10) to (12) above that with international trade, if a sector is produced 
in a country, the output of each country in that sector is the same. As a result, the implication 
of the Krugman (1980) model that wages may differ if countries differ in size does not arise 
in this model, since in this model, a larger country simply has more sectors, not larger sectors 
as is the case in Krugman (1980). With zero profits in equilibrium and labour as the only 
factor of production, the value of output in each sector in each country is equal to the wage 
bill in that sector, 𝑤𝐿𝑠 = 𝑤 𝜆⁄ . Following the approach in Krugman (1980), the value of a 
country’s exports in each sector are equal to the value of output in that sector times the 
demand from the rest of the world for the country’s output, divided by total world demand for 
the country’s output:  (Exports)𝑠∈𝑆1 = �𝑤𝜆� � �𝐿𝑊– 𝐿𝑖�𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌
𝐿𝑖+ �𝐿𝑊– 𝐿𝑖�𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌 �     (19) 
Exports depend on the size of the country relative to the rest of the world, and on the trade 
cost 𝜏.  
 
Because 𝜆𝐿𝑊/𝑆 > 1  countries are assumed to have a comparative advantage in any one 
sector, these countries will export different goods within that sector to each other. The value 
of a country’s imports in each of its comparative advantage sectors is equal to the value of 
output in that sector in each country times the country’s demand for each country’s output in 
that sector times the number of countries exporting that sector to the country in question, 
divided by total world demand for each country’s output in that sector:  
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(Imports)𝑠∈𝑆1 = �𝑤𝜆� � 𝐿𝑖𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌�𝜆𝐿𝑊𝑆 −1�
𝐿𝑖
∗+(𝐿𝑊−𝐿𝑖∗)𝜏 𝜌1−𝜌 �     (20) 
Where 𝐿𝑖∗ is the average labour force in the other countries that specialise in these sectors, and (𝜆𝐿𝑊 𝑆⁄ ) − 1 is the number of other countries which produce each sector in 𝑆1. Define the 
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⎫            for           𝑠 ∈ 𝑆1   (21b) 
= 0                                                                            for           𝑠 ∈ 𝑆2   (21c) 
Hence the trade-weighted aggregate GL index of intra-industry trade of a country across all 






⎧1 − � �𝐿𝑊– 𝐿𝑖�𝜏
𝜌
1−𝜌





















�     (22b) 
Where the last term on the right-hand-side is the share of sectors the country has a 
comparative advantage in (hence produces when international trade is allowed); this simple 
expression arises because we have assumed that all sectors are the same size. In the empirical 
analysis we will work exclusively with the TWGL index, since it yields more interesting 
results than the GL index across sectors. A country has a positive GL index which is constant 
across the sectors in which it has a comparative advantage, while it will have a GL index 
equal to zero in the other sectors.  
 
It can be shown that:  
𝑑𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝐿𝑖
>  0,                  𝑑𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝐿𝑖
∗ <  0,                  𝑑𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑑𝐿𝑊 >  0,     (23a) 
𝑑𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝜆
>  0,                  𝑑𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝑆
<  0,         (23b) 
𝑑𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝜏
<  0,                  𝑑𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝜌





>  0,                   𝑑𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝜌
<  0                  if                 𝐿𝑖 < 𝐿𝑖∗    (23d) 
The TWGL index increases the larger is the country, the smaller the other countries which 
have a comparative advantage in the same sectors, the larger the size of the world economy, 
the larger the number of sectors the country has a comparative advantage in, and the smaller 
the total number of sectors (which is equal to the number of sectors imported).  
 
The impact of the trade cost and the elasticity of substitution between goods depend on the 
size of the country relative to that of other countries which have a comparative advantage in 
the same sectors. If the country is larger than these other countries, then lower values of 𝜏 
(higher trade costs) or higher values of 𝜌 (the elasticity of substitution) imply higher values of 
the TWGL index, whereas the opposite is the case if the country is smaller than the other 
countries which have a comparative advantage in the same sectors. Empirically, because most 
countries’ main trading partner is a large country such as the US or China, only four countries 
have 𝐿𝑖 > 𝐿𝑖∗: the US, China, Japan and Germany. Hence for almost every country in the 
world, the model predicts that trade costs and the elasticity of substitution between goods will 
both be negatively related to the TWGL index. The result on trade costs is particularly 
important, since we have shown that in a very standard model without forward and backward 
linkages (for instance, Yi (2003)), trade costs reduce the share of intra-industry trade in total 
trade. The following Propositions summarise the main theoretical results of the paper:  
 
Proposition 1: The Trade-Weighted Grubel-Lloyd Index of intra-industry trade for a country 
is positively related to the size of the economy, the size of the world economy, and the 
number of comparative advantage sectors in the economy, and is negatively related to the 
average size of its trading partners and the total number of sectors (also the number of sectors 
imported).  
 
Proposition 2: If the country is larger than the average of its trading partners, the Trade-
Weighted Grubel-Lloyd Index is positively related to the trade cost, while if the country is 
smaller than the average of its trading partners, the Trade-Weighted Grubel-Lloyd Index is 
negatively related to the trade cost. 
 
Comparing the model’s predictions on the determinants of the TWGL index with the 
predictions of the Helpman (1987) model, in Helpman’s model the share of intra-industry 
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trade depends on the similarity in per capita GDP or relative endowments, and on the 
dispersion of per capita income. Kim and Oh (2001) show that the share of intra-industry 
trade also depends on relative country sizes and total country pair size, while Cieslik (2005) 
shows that the model predicts that the sum of the capital-labour ratios is also a determinant of 
the share of intra-industry trade. Bergstrand (1990) shows that trade costs influence the share 
of intra-industry trade. Therefore the main difference between our model and this previous 
work as summarised in Proposition 1 is that our model predicts a relationship between the 
number of sectors exported and imported and the TWGL index. In the empirical sections we 
will investigate whether this is an important determinant of the TWGL index.  
 
6 Data and methods 
 
We use 2010 data from the UN Comtrade database. The year 2010 was chosen because it is a 
recent year in which international trade flows were not severely affected by the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09, the Euro debt crisis of 2011-12, or the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
in March 2011 which disrupted global supply chains. Data on additional variables was 
obtained from other sources which will be discussed below. Combining the UN Comtrade 
data with data from these other sources results in a total of 118 countries in the empirical 
analysis.  
 
One of the key assumptions of the theoretical model is that a country has a comparative 
advantage in a subset of the available sectors. As discussed in Section 4, if each country has a 
comparative advantage in only one sector, then it would be completely specialised in this 
sector. On the other hand, if all countries have the same technology in all sectors, countries 
would simultaneously export and import all sectors so that the number of sectors exported is 
the same as the number imported, as each country would produce different goods within each 
sector. Figure 1 shows the number of 5-digit SITC Revision 4 sectors (a total of 2,652 
sectors) exported and imported by all the countries in the database, where each data point 
represents a country, and the dashed line represents equal numbers of exporting and 
importing sectors. The correlation coefficient between the two series is 0.7247. Almost all 
countries are below the 45-degree line (the exception is India), indicating that countries 
export fewer sectors than they import. This is also true of the average number of sectors 
exported and imported, which are 1,417 and 2,083 sectors respectively. Hanson (2012) also 
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documents this specialisation in exports across countries. A similar figure can be drawn for 
different levels of aggregation – in general, the more aggregated the data, the higher the 
correlation between the number of sectors exported and imported, as we would expect: at the 
4-, 3-, 2- and 1-digit levels the correlation between number of sectors exported and imported 
is 0.7298, 0.7979, 0.8415, and 0.8781, respectively. 
 
The data shows that the average TWGL index increases the more aggregated is the data. The 
average TWGL index at the 5-digit level of aggregation is 0.25, while at the 4-digit level it is 
0.29, at the 3-digit level it is 0.34, and the 2-digit level it is 0.40, and at the 1-digit level it is 
0.53. That is, to some extent the degree of intra-industry trade is an artefact of industrial 
aggregation; a similar point has been made by Greenaway and Milner (1983) and Bhagwati 
and Davis (1999). Table 1 shows the countries with the largest and smallest values of the 
TWGL index at the 5-digit level. While the countries with the largest values of the TWGL 
index are mostly developed countries and countries that are important entrepot countries 
which export and import large quantities of goods, the countries with the smallest values are 
mostly small, less-developed island countries that produce and export relatively few goods. 
This provides motivation for dividing the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries later 
in the empirical analysis.  
 
The key empirical prediction of the model as summarised in Propositions 1 and 2 is that the 
trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd (TWGL) index of intra-industry trade is positively related to a 
country’s size, the size of the world economy, and the number of sectors it exports, and is 
negatively related to the number of sectors a country imports and the average size of its 
trading partners. In addition, trade costs are negatively related to the TWGL index if the 
country is smaller than its trading partners on average, but the opposite relationship holds if 
the country is larger than its trading partners. Hence for country 𝑖 we estimate the following 
equation:  
𝑇𝑊𝐺𝐿𝑖 =  𝛽0 +   𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 +  𝛽4 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝚥≠𝚤���������     + 𝛽5𝑇𝐶 +  𝛽6𝐷 +  𝛽7𝑇𝐶 × 𝐷 +  𝜖𝑖       (24) 
We measure country size and average trading partner size7 by GDP measured in constant US 
dollars, obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. We use two 
proxies for trade cost: the average applied tariff on manufactured goods imposed by a 
                                                          
7 Using average importing partner size or average exporting partner size yields almost identical results to those 
reported in the results below.  
15 
 
country’s trading partners also obtained from the World Development Indicators, and the 
average distance of a country from its trading partners, measured by the great circle distance 
between the most important cities in each country, obtained from the GeoDist database 
compiled by Mayer and Zignago (2011) and available at the CEPII (Centre D’Etudes 
Prospectives Et D’Informations Internationales) website. The trade cost and partner GDP 
variables are weighted by the share of trade with each trading partner. D is a dummy that 
takes a value equal to 1 when a country’s GDP is larger than the average of its trading 
partners’ GDP. We interact D with both measures of trade cost to capture the different 
relationship between trade cost and the TWGL index depending on relative country sizes. 
Note also that we do not include a measure of World GDP in equation (24) since we only use 
data from one time period.  
 
Previous empirical work such as Bergstrand (1990), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), 
Debaere (2005), Bergstrand and Egger (2006) and Kamata (2010) have used a limited 
dependent variable estimator since the GL index is bounded between zero and one (a logistic 
transformation in the case of Hummels and Levinsohn, Bergstrand, and Bergstrand and 
Egger, a Tobit estimator in the case of Debaere, and a Poisson Quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimator in the case of Kamata). In this paper, we work with the TWGL index as compared 
with the bilateral GL index used in this other work. This is significant, since where previous 
work has encountered instances where the empirical bilateral GL index is equal to zero, we 
document no cases of the aggregate TWGL index being equal to zero in our sample. 
Nevertheless, we report the results using a Tobit estimator in addition to standard OLS 
estimates. We also report the results of a weighted regression, weighting observations by the 
natural log of each country’s total trade, to take into account the fact that countries are not 
equally important in world trade.   
 
7 Empirical results 
 
The results of estimating equation (24) excluding the interaction terms are reported in Table 
2. All regression results are reported with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Columns (1) 
to (3) report OLS estimates, columns (4) to (6) report Tobit estimates, and column (7) reports 
Tobit results with the observations weighted by the natural log of each country’s total trade. 
Column (1) uses average distance from trading partners as the proxy for trade costs. As 
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predicted by the model, the number of exported sectors is positively related to the TWGL 
index, while the number of imported sectors is negatively related to the TWGL index. The 
coefficients are highly statistically significant, and hold across the different specifications in 
the rest of Table 2. Reporter country GDP is positively related to the TWGL index while 
average trading partner GDP is negatively related to the TWGL index across all 
specifications. These are as predicted by the model, although this time the coefficients are 
often not significant at conventional levels. Average distance from trading partners is 
negatively associated with the TWGL index; countries which are further away from their 
trading partners are less likely to engage in intra-industry trade. This is consistent with the 
model if countries are smaller on average than their trading partners.  
 
Column (2) of Table 2 replaces average distance from trading partners with the average tariff 
imposed by a country’s trading partners as a measure of trade cost. This has a negative albeit 
insignificant coefficient. Column (3) includes both average distance and average tariffs; the 
negative and significant coefficient on average distance from trading partners remains, but 
the average trading partner tariff is now positive (but still insignificant).  
 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 2 perform the same regressions as columns (1) to (3), using a 
Tobit estimator. We obtain exactly the same coefficient estimates as in columns (1) to (3). 
The standard errors are slightly different, but the statistical significance of the results is not 
affected. This is perhaps unsurprising; as noted in Section 6, there are no censored 
observations in our dataset, hence the Tobit estimator yields the same coefficient estimates as 
OLS. As a result, the regression results reported in the rest of the paper make use of OLS 
estimates. Finally, column (7) performs the same regression as in column (6), but weighting 
each observation by the natural log of each country’s total trade. The results are very similar 
to the unweighted results.  
 
Overall the results of Table 2 provide strong evidence in support of the predictive powers of 
the model. All the coefficients are of the expected sign, and significantly so in the case of the 
number of sectors imported and exported, and trade costs. In addition, the R-squared of the 
regression is relatively high – above 0.6 in all specifications. 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the interaction between the trade cost measures with a dummy 
for whether the country is larger than its trading partners on average, as suggested by 
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Proposition 2. As noted in Section 5, only four countries have 𝐷 =  1: the US, China, Japan 
and Germany. In column (1), the dummy variable has a positive and significant coefficient, 
indicating that the four countries that are larger than their trading partners on average have a 
higher TWGL index, while the interaction with average distance is negative but not 
significant. Similar results are obtained in column (2) when distance is replaced by average 
partner tariffs. However, when both measures of trade cost are included in column (3), the 
interaction between the dummy and distance from trading partner is negative and significant, 
suggesting that countries that are larger than their trading partners have an even larger decline 
in the TWGL index the further they are from their trading partners on average. On the other 
hand, the interaction between the dummy and average trading partner tariff is positive and 
significant, suggesting the opposite interpretation for the relationship between the TWGL 
index and trade barriers. These seemingly contradictory results are probably due to the fact 
that there are only four countries for which 𝐷 =  1, so that any relationships obtained are 
likely to depend more on the idiosyncratic features of these four countries than on any 
general trend8.  
 
A key contribution of Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) is to perform the empirical analysis on 
OECD and non-OECD countries separately. This is based on the idea that the model of intra-
industry trade may be expected to fit OECD countries better than non-OECD countries, 
because OECD countries specialise in differentiated manufactured goods whereas non-OECD 
countries specialise in non-differentiated goods. We can perform the same division with our 
data; our sample consists of 34 OECD countries and 84 non-OECD countries. That OECD 
countries engage in more intra-industry trade than non-OECD countries is corroborated in our 
data; at the 5-digit level, the average TWGL index for OECD countries is 0.46, while it is 
0.17 for non-OECD countries.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (24) for OECD and non-OECD countries 
separately. We focus on the analogues to columns (1) to (3) in Table 2, excluding the 
interaction terms. The table does indeed suggest that the model fits OECD countries better 
than non-OECD countries. The R-squared of the regressions are much higher for OECD 
countries: between 0.6 and 0.7 compared to between 0.4 and 0.5 for non-OECD countries. 
For both OECD and non-OECD countries, the number of exported sectors is positively and 
                                                          
8 We have also estimated Table 2 excluding the four countries for which 𝐷 =  1; the results are very similar to 
those reported.  
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significantly related to the TWGL index, while the number of imported sectors is negatively 
and significantly related to the TWGL index. Neither reporter nor average partner GDP has 
any significant effect in either group of countries, although OECD countries have coefficient 
signs that are in accord with the theoretical model whereas non-OECD countries do not. 
Trade costs have no significant impact on the TWGL index for non-OECD countries. For 
OECD countries, trade costs as measured either by distance from trading partners or trading 
partner tariffs are negatively and significantly related to the TWGL index when these 
measures are included separately in the regression. When both measures of trade costs are 
included together, only distance from trading partners has a negative and significant effect on 




As more countries join the global trading system, and as more goods are traded and 
consumed, more models of international trade are developed, to help us understand the 
pattern of and the gains from international trade. This paper presents a model of international 
trade with many goods and many countries which combines Ricardian comparative 
advantage, monopolistic competition, and trade costs. Two main theoretical results are 
obtained. First, the gains from trade are shown to be larger for smaller countries, and smaller 
the higher is the trade cost and the more similar are countries to each other. Second, the trade 
pattern that emerges in the model is both inter- and intra-industry in nature. The model yields 
a prediction linking the share of intra-industry trade as measured by the trade-weighted 
Grubel-Lloyd index to the number of sectors exported and imported by the country, the size 
of the country and the average size of its trading partners, and the trade cost. These 
predictions are broadly consistent with a cross-section of countries using 2010 data from the 
UN Comtrade database. In addition, OECD countries fit the model better than non-OECD 
countries, as would be expected if OECD countries specialise in differentiated goods while 
non-OECD countries specialise in non-differentiated goods. The simple structure of the 
theoretical model presented in this paper of course prevents it from fully capturing all the 
complexities of international trade patterns.  
 
The theoretical model yields new predictions on the determinants of the Grubel-Lloyd index 
compared to the Helpman (1987) model; in particular, the role of the number of sectors 
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traded. In principle it would be possible to compare the performance of the two models; here 
we have refrained from doing so, taking the line advocated by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) 
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Table 1: Countries with the largest and smallest values for the trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd 
(TWGL) index (5-digit SITC).  
Largest TWGL Index  Smallest TWGL Index 
Country TWGL Index  Country TWGL Index 
Belgium 0.736  Samoa 0.0142 
Singapore 0.727  Tonga 0.0120 
Netherlands 0.721  Cape Verde 0.0104 
Panama 0.687  Belize 0.0099 
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Table 2: The determinants of the trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd index.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit Tobit Weighted 
Tobit 
Exported sectors 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Imported sectors -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Reporter GDP 1.299* 0.983 1.292* 1.299* 0.983 1.292* 1.321* 
 (0.756) (0.734) (0.746) (0.740) (0.718) (0.727) (0.750) 
Average partner GDP -0.828 -3.012 -0.800 -0.828 -3.012* -0.800 -0.641 
(1.602) (1.822) (1.627) (1.568) (1.783) (1.585) (1.656) 
Average distance 
from trading partners 
-2.182***  -2.557*** -2.182***  -2.557*** -2.635*** 
(0.601)  (0.644) (0.588)  (0.627) (0.631) 
Average partner tariff  -1.173 1.252  -1.173 1.252 1.273 
 (1.061) (1.138)  (1.038) (1.109) (1.141) 
Constant 19.989 83.245* 16.686 19.989 83.245* 16.686 11.981 
 (41.422) (47.473) (41.454) (40.522) (46.447) (40.376) (41.658) 
R2 0.67 0.62 0.68     
N 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
Notes: The dependent variable is the trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Estimation 
method is OLS in columns (1) to (3), Tobit in columns (4) to (6), and Tobit weighted by log trade flows in column (7). Figures in parentheses are heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors.   
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Table 3: Results of the interaction terms in equation (24).  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Exported sectors 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Imported sectors -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Reporter GDP 1.194 0.914 1.244 
 (0.830) (0.850) (0.831) 
Average partner GDP -0.774 -2.971 -0.604 
 (1.616) (1.867) (1.647) 
Average distance from 
trading partners 
-2.144***  -2.504*** 
(0.604)  (0.648) 
Reporter GDP > Average 
partner GDP (D) 
0.175* 0.102 -0.267** 
(0.104) (0.350) (0.116) 
D * Average distance from 
trading partners 
-0.026  -0.115*** 
(0.022)  (0.021) 
Average partner tariff  -1.152 1.116 
  (1.079) (1.152) 
D * Average partner tariff  -0.025 0.269*** 
  (0.091) (0.062) 
Constant 20.736 83.516* 13.614 
 (41.799) (47.989) (41.823) 
R2 0.67 0.62 0.68 
N 118 118 118 
Notes: The dependent variable is the trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade. *** significant 
at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Estimation method is OLS. Figures in parentheses are 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. D is a dummy equal to 1 if Reporter GDP > Average Partner GDP.   
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Table 4: Dividing the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries.  
Sample OECD  OECD OECD  Non-OECD  Non-OECD Non-OECD 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Exported sectors 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.040***  0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Imported sectors -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.032***  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Reporter GDP 1.620 1.932 1.663  -0.123 -0.378 -0.117 
 (1.195) (1.638) (1.252)  (0.892) (0.772) (0.881) 
Average partner GDP -0.815 -5.022 -0.947  -0.955 -1.806 -0.972 
 (4.336) (4.936) (4.326)  (1.596) (1.899) (1.620) 
Average distance 
from trading partners 
-3.120***  -2.970***  -0.984  -1.369 
(0.487)  (0.789)  (0.833)  (0.930) 
Average partner tariff  -9.255*** -0.667   0.198 1.150 
  (2.583) (3.317)   (1.053) (1.181) 
Constant 27.143 158.181 31.586  49.535 74.388 47.585 
 (114.354) (128.266) (112.987)  (44.602) (51.877) (44.013) 
R2 0.71 0.65 0.71  0.46 0.45 0.47 
N 34 34 34  84 84 84 
Notes: The dependent variable is the trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Estimation 
method is OLS. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. 
 
